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I. INTRODUCTION
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) entered
into force on January 1, 1948,1 in response to the growing interdepen-
dence of national economies and the consequent need to develop a base
for increased international trade.2 The GATT is both a multilateral
trade agreement and an institution that oversees the agreement's opera-
1. The GATT is applied through the Protocol of Provisional Application, signed
by the original twenty-three members of GATT. The original members were Australia,
Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, India,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Rhodesia, South Africa,
the United Kingdom and the United States. China, Lebanon and Syria were also origi-
nal members but have since withdrawn. JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE
LAW OF GATT 898 (1969).
The GATT was to have been one component of the International Trade Organiza-
tion (ITO), which in turn was to combine with the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund to form the basis of the postwar international economic system. When
the ITO collapsed in 1949, however, the GATT remained as the core international
organization. ENVIRONMENT AND TRADE 20 n.l (1982) (Seymour J. Rubin & Thomas
R. Graham eds., 1982) [hereinafter Rubin & Graham].
2. See OLIVER LONG, LAW AND ITS LIMITATIONS IN THE GATT MULTILATERAL
TRADE SYSTEM 43 (1985).
(229)
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tion.3 It effects its purpose by providing both a legal framework for
trade relations between member countries, and a forum for trade nego-
tiations and for dispute resolutions." The GATT's key purpose is to pro-
mote international trade of goods and services through the reduction of
tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade.' Although throughout much of
its history the GATT focused primarily on reducing tariffs, 6 it later
recognized the need to address non-tariff barriers, such as quotas and
import licenses.7 Non-tariff barriers also include environmental protec-
tion measures that often compete with the GATT goals of free trade.'
This Comment focuses on such a conflict between environmental
protection and free trade. The conflict at issue arose when Mexico re-
cently challenged a U.S. law limiting tuna imports because of the ad-
verse effect of tuna harvesting on marine mammals.' A GATT panel,10
established to resolve the dispute, held that the law violated the
GATT." Consequently, the panel decision stripped the United States
of its ability to further its environmental policy objectives in the global
commons, thus creating serious implications for nations desiring to pro-
mote environmental goals while still operating within the GATT
framework.
Part II of this Comment highlights the relevant sections of the
GATT. Part III discusses the U.S. law at issue - the Marine Mam-
mal Protection Act (MMPA)"2 - and then describes how this Act led
to the dispute between the United States and Mexico. Parts IV, V and
VI detail the GATT panel decision, the immediate consequences of the
decision and its long term implications. Finally, Part VII of this Com-
ment discusses proposed responses to the environmental protection/free
trade conflict.
3. Id. at 5.
4. Id.
5. Primer: A Layperson's Guide to Trade and the Environment, GREENWIRE, Oct.
16, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File. Currently, close to one hun-
dred nations, accounting for more than eighty-five percent of world trade, are members
of GATT. Id.
6. JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 117 (1989) [hereinafter
JACKSON]. The GATT has been successful in its primary objective of reducing tariffs.
The seven completed GATT trade negotiating rounds have resulted in an overall reduc-
tion in tariffs on industrial products to a level of about 4.7 percent. Id.
7. 137 CONG. REC. S13,169 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1991) (statement of Sen. Baucus)
[hereinafter Baucus].
8. See JACKSON, supra note 6, at 203-16.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 56-63.
10. See infra note 59.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 64-94.
12. Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1988).
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II. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE GATT
An integral component of the GATT's liberal trade objectives is
eliminating discrimination.13 In the GATT context, nondiscrimination,
defined as promoting equal access to a nation's markets, takes two
forms. First, it is promoted through the Most Favored Nation (MFN)
provision of Article I of the Agreement."' This provision requires that
each GATT member grant any other GATT member the most
favorable treatment that the member extends to all other countries
with respect to imports and exports.' 5 A second nondiscrimination re-
quirement is found in the "national treatment" directive of Article
Il1.6 "National treatment" prohibits imported goods from being
treated any worse than domestically produced goods once they have
cleared customs and border procedures, the goods may not be.' 7 In
other words, Article Ill obligates an importing country to treat "like
products" equally regardless of origin.' 8 A third safeguard against dis-
crimination is also found in Article XI. 9 This Article prohibits non-
tariff barriers by banning many types of import restrictions and
prohibitions.2 0
13. JOHN H. JACKSON & WILLIAM J. DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 297 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter JACKSON & DAVEY].
14. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. I, T.I.A.S. No.
1700, at 641 [hereinafter GATT].
15. The relevant language of Article I reads:
1. With respect to customs and duties and charges of any kind imposed on or
in connection with importation or exportation . . . and with respect to all rules
and formalities in connection with importation and exportation . . . any ad-
vantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to
any product originating in or destined for any country shall be accorded im-
mediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined
for the territories of all other contracting parties.
Id. See also JACKSON, supra note 6, at 133.
16. GATT, supra note 14, art. III at 644-45. See also JACKSON, supra note 6, at
189.
17. The relevant language of Article III reads:
2. The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the
territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less
favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of
all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for
sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use.
GATT, supra note 14, art. III at 645. See also JACKSON, supra note 6, at 189.
18. GATT, supra note 14, art. III at 644-45.
19. Id. art. X1 at 653-54.
20. The relevant provision of Article XI reads:
1. No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges,
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Conflict arises, however, between the above GATT provisions and
other legitimate governmental policies.2 As occurred in the U.S./Mex-
ico dispute, for example, a government may choose to enact certain
conservation policies, the success of which depends on discrimination
against nations not in compliance with these policies. Under the recent
interpretation of Article III, however, the permissible scope of such dis-
crimination is severely limited. An importing country can only enact
measures for products that themselves create a pollution hazard.2' The
country cannot address problems resulting from the manufacturing or
harvesting processes of the exporting countries even though those
processes may adversely impact the importing country." Products pro-
duced in different manners are still considered "like.""' Thus, under
Article III, an importing country cannot require an exporting country
to comply with the former's manufacturing regulations.", As a result,
many environmental objectives cannot be achieved and domestic com-
panies are placed at an unfair advantage.' 6
Some legitimate environmental objectives are, however, preserved
by Article XX 27 of the GATT. Nonetheless, Article XX fails to address
adequately the above conflict. Article XX lists some valid domestic pol-
icies as exceptions to the GATT obligations. For example, governmen-
tal measures to promote public morals, to protect the lives and health
of humans, animals or plants, to ban products of prison labor, to pre-
vent deceptive practices and to conserve natural resources are expressly
included within Article XX.28 Thus, the Article recognizes the impor-
tance of promoting these policies regardless of a conflict with free
world trade.29 It is important to note, however, that Article XX has
been interpreted to allow exceptions for health, safety and conservation
whether made effective through quotas, import or export licenses or other
measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the
importation of any product of the territory of any other contracting party or
on the exportation or sale for export of any product desired for the territory of
any other contracting party.
Id. See also JACKSON, supra note 6, at 129.
21. JACKSON, supra note 6, at 203.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 66-74.
23. See JACKSON, supra note 6, at 208-09.
24. Id. at 209.
25. See id. at 208.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 163-165.
27. GATT, supra note 14, art. XX at 669-70.
28. Id. See also JACKSON, supra note 6, at 206.
29. JACKSON, supra note 6, at 206.
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regulations of the importing country only. 30
III. THE UNITED STATES/MEXICO DISPUTE
A. The Marine Mammal Protection Act and Other Relevant
Statutes
The failure of the GATT to provide for valid environmental pro-
tection measures was illustrated when Mexico challenged the U.S.
Marine Mammal Protection Act." The MMPA was enacted by the
U.S. Congress to prevent serious injury or incidental killing of marine
mammals in the course of commercial fishing, especially in the Eastern
Tropical Pacific Ocean (ETP). 2 The ETP was of special concern to
Congress because dolphins and tuna inhabit the same areas in these
waters.33 Knowing this, commercial fishermen in the ETP intentionally
encircled the dolphins with purse-seine nets in order to catch the tuna
swimming underneath.34 Prior to the passage of the MMPA, these fish-
ing techniques resulted in the death of an estimated 250,000 dolphins
per year.35
To address these fishing techniques, section 1371(a)(2) of the
MMPA authorizes limited incidental taking of marine mammals by
U.S. fishermen in the course of commercial fishing pursuant to a per-
mit.e Under this general permit, no more than 20,500 dolphins may be
30. See infra text accompanying notes 77-83. In addition, Article XX includes
clauses to protect against abuses by nations attempting to restrain imports on unjustifi-
able grounds. GATT, supra note 14, at 669. The relevant passage is found at the text
accompanying note 76.
31. For a discussion of the challenge, see infra text accompanying notes 56-63.
32. The Congressional declaration of policy states in part:
The Congress finds that -
(1) certain species and population stocks of marine mammals are, or may be,
in danger of extinction or depletion as a result of man's activities;
(2) such species and population stocks should not be permitted to diminish
beyond the point at which they cease to be a significant functioning element
in the ecosystem of which they are a part, and, consistent with this major
objective, they should not be permitted to diminish below their optimal sus-
tainable population.
16 U.S.C. § 1361. See also Panel Report, United States - Restrictions on Imports of
Tuna, GATT, DS21/R (1991) [hereinafter Panel Report].
33. See Panel Report, supra note 32, 2.2.
34. Id.
35. Laura L. Lones, Note, The Marine Mammal Protection Act and Interna-
tional Protection of Cetaceans: A Unilateral Attempt to Effectuate Transnational
Conservation, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 997, 999 (1989).
36. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2).
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incidentally killed or injured each year by the U.S. fleet fishing in the
ETP.3 1 Moreover, section 1371(a)(2)(B) of the Act prohibits the im-
portation of yellowfin tuna from countries that permit harvesting with
purse-seine nets in the ETP, unless the Secretary of Commerce finds
that the average rate of incidental taking of marine mammals by.ves-
sels of the harvesting nation is comparable to the average rate of such
taking by U.S. vessels.38
The MMPA also regulates imports from intermediary countries.39
Section 1371(a)(2)(C) of the MMPA states that any intermediary na-
tion that exports yellowfin tuna to the United States shall be required
to certify to the Secretary of Commerce that it has acted to prohibit
the importation of such tuna from any nation whose tuna exports to the
United States are banned."0
Furthermore, the MMPA provides that six months after the effec-
tive date of an embargo on yellowfin tuna or tuna products, the Secre-
tary of Commerce shall certify this fact to the President. 41 This certifi-
cation triggers section 1978 of the Fishermen's Protective Act of
1967,42 also known as the "Pelly Amendment." The provision provides
the President with discretionary authority to order a prohibition of im-
ports of fish products from the embargoed country "for such duration
as the President determines appropriate and to the extent that such
prohibition is sanctioned by the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade.'4
The Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act (DPCIA)"
37. Panel Report, supra note 32, 2.4.
38. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(B). Specifically, the average incidental taking rate
cannot exceed 1.25 times the average taking rate of U.S. vessels in the same period. Id.
39. Intermediary countries are countries that are not directly subject to the
embargo.
40. The relevant provision of § 1371 of the MMPA states that the Secretary of
Commerce:
shall require the government of any intermediary nation from which yellowfin
tuna or tuna products will be exported to the United States to certify and
provide reasonable proof that it has acted to prohibit the importation of such
tuna and tuna products from any nation from which direct export to the
United States of such tuna and tuna products is banned under this section
within sixty days following the effective date of such ban on importation to
the United States.
16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(C).
41. Id. § 1371(a)(2)(D).
42. Fishermen's Protective Act, 22 U.S.C. § 1978(a) (1988).
43. Id.
44. Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1385 (Supp. III
1991).
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was also enacted to protect marine mammals." DPCIA specifies label-
ling requirements for any tuna product exported from, or offered for
sale in, the United States." The Act states that it is a violation of
section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA) for any pro-
ducer, importer, exporter, distributor or seller to place a label on a tuna
product stating that the tuna is "dolphin safe" or any other term
falsely suggesting that the tuna was harvested in a-manner safe to dol-
phins, if it were fished in a manner harmful to dolphins.4
B. History of the United States/Mexico Dispute
From 1984 to 1990 the U.S. government failed to enforce the
MMPA requirements, despite evidence that the foreign fleets were ex-
ceeding their allowed dolphin mortality rates." In 1990, Earth Island
Institute, an environmental organization, brought suit against the Com-
merce and Treasury Departments49 for failure to enforce the MMPA
comparability requirements." In August 1990 and again in October
1990, the U.S. District Court in San Francisco found that the MMPA
required the yellowfin tuna import embargo against Mexico5" because
Mexico exceeded the dolphin kill rate of 1.25 times the U.S. rate. 52
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld this ruling, despite a
45. Id. § 1385(b)(1)(2). See also Panel Report, supra note 32, 3.3.
46. Id. § 1385(d).
47. 16 U.S.C. § 1385. Tuna is considered to be harvested in a manner harmful to
dolphins if it either: (1) is harvested in the ETP by a vessel using purse-seine nets
which do not meet specific conditions for being considered dolphin safe; or (2) is har-
vested on the high seas by a vessel engaged in driftnet fishing. Id. § 1385(d)(1)(A),(B).
48. GATT: Implications on Environmental Laws: Hearing Before the Subcom-
mittee on Health and the Environment of the House Energy and Commerce Commit-
tee, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 53 (1991) [hereinafter Hearing] (testimony of David Phil-
lips, Executive Director of Earth Island Institute).
49. The U.S. Customs Service, under the Treasury Department, is responsible for
enforcing the importation requirements of the MMPA. Panel Report, supra note 32,
2.3.
50. Earth Island Inst. v. Mosbacher, 746 F. Supp. 964 (N.D. Cal. 1990), aff'd,
Earth Island Inst. v. Mosbacher 929 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1991). See also Hearing,
supra note 48, at 54 (testimony of David Phillips, Executive Director of Earth Island
Institute).
51. Embargoes were also placed against Venezuela, Ecuador, Panama, and Vanu-
atu. Since that time, Ecuador and Panama have placed international observers on all
their tuna vessels and enacted legislation prohibiting the vessels from setting nets on
dolphins. Hearing, supra note 48, at 54-55 (testimony of David Phillips, Executive Di-
rector of Earth Island Institute).
52. Panel Report, supra note 32, T 2.7. See Hearing, supra note 48, at 54 (testi-
mony of David Phillips, Executive Director of Earth Island Institute).
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strongly fought appeal by the U.S. government."3 The Ninth Circuit
ruled unanimously that tuna import embargoes against Mexico were
required under the law. 54 The U.S. Customs Service, acting under the
Treasury Department, then put an embargo in place against Mexico.
Despite the embargo, Mexico continued to violate the MMPA dolphin
mortality rates and thus remained under embargo.
55
In response to the embargo, Mexico filed a formal complaint with
GATT.56 Asserting that the MMPA regulations conflicted with the
GATT, Mexico requested consultations with the United States.5 7 These
talks were unsuccessful, and Mexico consequently requested that the
CONTRACTING PARTIES 58 establish a panel under Article XX-
111:251 to examine the matter.60 The Council6" agreed to establish the
panel, and the panel held meetings with the parties to the dispute and
other interested countries.6 2 The panel submitted its conclusions on Au-
53. Earth Island Inst. v. Mosbacher, 929 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1991). See also
Hearing, supra note 48, at 60 (testimony of David Phillips, Executive Director of Earth
Island Institute).
54. Mosbacher, 929 F.2d 1449.
55. See Hearing, supra note 48, at 55 (testimony of David Phillips, Executive
Director of Earth Island Institute).
56. Id.
57. Panel Report, supra note 32, 1.1. The consultation and conciliation process
is a key component of the GATT dispute resolution process. LONG, supra note 2, at 87.
58. "Under Article XXV:I the contracting parties acting jointly are described in
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade as the 'CONTRACTING PARTIES'...
• The 'contracting parties' in small letters means the individual member countries."
LONG, supra note 2, at 6 n.15.
59. GATT, supra note 14, art. XXIII at 671. Article XXIII:2 reads, in part:
2. If no satisfactory adjustment is effected between the contracting parties
concerned within a reasonable time .... the matter may be referred to the
CONTRACTING PARTIES. The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall
promptly investigate any matter so referred to them and shall make appropri-
ate recommendations to the contracting parties which they consider to be con-
cerned, or give a ruling on the matter as appropriate.
Id. In practice, the investigation and resolution of the matter is entrusted to a panel of
experts. LONG, supra note 2, at 77.
60. Panel Report, supra note 32, T 1.1.
61. The Council is the intersessional body and the executive organ of the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES. The Council prepares the sessions of the CONTRACTING
PARTIES, oversees the work of the various committees and examines reports and
makes appropriate recommendations to the CONTRACTING PARTIES. In addition,
the Council appoints panel members for dispute settlement procedures. LONG, supra
note 2, at 47.
62. Countries intervening on behalf of Mexico included Australia, Canada, the
European Community, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Norway, Philippines, Senegal, Thai-
land and Venezuela. See Panel Report, supra note 32, at 4.
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gust 16, 1991.3
IV. THE PANEL DECISION
The panel examined four issues in light of the GATT obligations.
The four issues raised were: (1) the United States' prohibition of im-
ports of certain yellowfin tuna and tuna products from Mexico; (2) the
possible extension of each of these import prohibitions to all fish prod-
ucts from Mexico under MMPA and Section 8 of the Fishermen's Pro-
tective Act (the Pelly Amendment); (3) the United States' prohibition
of imports of certain yellowfin tuna and tuna products from intermedi-
ary nations; and (4) the application of the labelling provisions of the
DPCIA to tuna from Mexico."' If these issues were found to be GATT
inconsistent, the panel then considered whether they fell within the Ar-
ticle XX exceptions . 5
The panel first addressed the primary embargo against Mexico.
Mexico argued that the measures banning imports of tuna from Mex-
ico were quantitative restrictions prohibited under Article XI of
GATT.66 The United States asserted that the measures were subject to
Article III (national treatment) of the GATT rather than Article XI
(quantitative restrictions).8 7 In support of this proposition, the United
States noted that because the embargo treated foreign-caught tuna no
less favorably than domestic-caught tuna, it fulfilled the national treat-
ment obligations of Article III. Furthermore, it was a valid internal
measure enforced at the time or point of importation in accordance
with the Ad Article III, which reads:
Any internal ... regulation [affecting the sale of products] ...
which applies to an imported product and to the like domestic
product and is collected or enforced in the case of the imported
product at the time or point of importation, is nevertheless to be
regarded as an internal ... regulation ... subject to the provi-
sions of Article 111.68
63. Id. 1.3.
64. Id. 5.7.
65. See id.
66. Id. 5.8. Quantitative restrictions are quotas or other measures, other than
duties, which are used to restrict imports and/or exports. See GATT, supra note 14,
art. XI at 653.
67. Panel Report, supra note 32, T 5.8.
68. GATT, supra note 14, ad art. III. The "Ad" articles are the interpretive notes
that accompany the GATT articles, and are found in the appendix of any reproduction
of the GATT.
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The panel, however, found that the embargo provisions were not
internal regulations covered under Article III. The panel held that Ar-
ticle III applied only to measures affecting products, and found that
the MMPA did not regulate tuna products as such but instead pre-
scribed certain fishing techniques to protect dolphins. Although the
MMPA regulates the domestic harvesting of yellowfin tuna, the panel
noted that these regulations could not be regarded as applicable to the
products themselves because they did not directly regulate the sale of
tuna nor did they affect tuna as a product."' Therefore, the panel con-
cluded that the import prohibition was not an internal regulation cov-
ered by Ad Article 111.70 Similarly, the panel found that even if the
MMPA provisions were regarded as regulating the sale of a product,
the import prohibition did not meet the requirements of Article 111:4
which mandated "a comparison of the treatment of imported tuna as a
product with that of domestic tuna as a product."'" Regulations gov-
erning the incidental taking of dolphins in the course of harvesting tuna
could not, the panel said, affect tuna as a product.7 2 Therefore, Article
111:4 required Mexican tuna to be accorded no less favorable treatment
than is accorded U.S. tuna, despite the different rate of dolphin
deaths.7 3 After determining that the MMPA provisions were not pro-
tected under Article III, the panel concluded the provisions were im-
port prohibitions contrary to Article XI.
71
The panel next addressed the justifications raised by the United
States under Article XX (b) and (g). Although Mexico asserted that
contracting parties could not simultaneously argue a measure's compat-
ibility with the GATT and invoke Article XX, since Article XX con-
tained exceptions to the GATT directives, the panel held that simulta-
neous arguments were allowed. 75 The relevant provision of Article XX
provides:
69. Panel Report, supra note 32, T 5.10.
70. Id. 5.14.
71. Id. 5.15. Article III:4 reads:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the terri-
tory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less fa-
vourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of
all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for
sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use.
GATT, supra note 14, art. 111:4 at 645.
72. Panel Report, supra note 32, 5.1.5.
73. Id.
74. Id. 5.18.
75. Id. 5.22.
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Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied
in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international
trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent
the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of mea-
sures: . . .
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
health; . . .
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural re-
sources if such measures are made effective in conjunction
with restrictions on domestic production or consumption.76
The panel first addressed the possible justification raised in Article
XX(b). As noted above, Article XX(b) requires that an act's purpose
be "necessary," that is, that there be no reasonable alternative mea-
sures available to accomplish the act's particular purpose. In this in-
stance, the United States maintained that the MMPA's purpose was to
protect the health and safety of the dolphin population. Because Mex-
ico continued to use harvesting practices in contravention of the Act's
provisions thereby endangering the dolphin population, the only option
available to the United States to effectuate the Act was to enforce the
embargo against Mexico." Mexico, on the other hand, argued that Ar-
ticle XX(b) was inapplicable to protect the life or health of animals
outside the jurisdiction of the contracting party. 8 Moreover, Mexico
asserted the import provisions were unnecessary because there were
GATT consistent alternatives, such as international cooperation be-
tween the parties. 7 9
The panel concurred with Mexico and found that the MMPA im-
port ban was not justified by Article XX(b). 80 Article XX(b), the panel
stated, did not clearly answer the question of whether it covers mea-
sures necessary to protect the lives or health of humans, animals, or
plants outside the jurisdiction of the contracting party taking the mea-
sure.81 Therefore the panel believed that the issue should be analyzed
in light of the drafting history, purpose of the provision and the opera-
76. GATT, supra note 14, art. XX at 669.
77. Panel Report, supra note 32, 5.24.
78. Id.
79. Id. International cooperation, however, often entails bringing environmental
standards down to the lowest common denominator. See infra notes 119, 159.
80. Panel Report, supra note 32, 5.29.
81. Id. 5.25.
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tional consequences of the alternative interpretations."2 The panel con-
cluded that the drafting of Article XX(b) focused on the use of sani-
tary measures to safeguard the life or health of humans, animals or
plants within the jurisdiction of the importing country."3
Furthermore, the panel held that the implications of the U.S. anal-
ysis of Article XX(b) would be far too broad. 4 Each party remains
free under GATT to set its own environmental policies, but if the U.S.
interpretation were accepted each party could unilaterally determine
life or health standards that other countries would be required to fol-
low.8 5 As a result, the GATT would change from a multilateral agree-
ment to a device that protects only those countries with identical
regulations.8 6
Moreover, the panel continued, even if Article XX(b) were inter-
preted to allow extra-jurisdictional application of life and health mea-
sures, the MMPA provisions would not be "necessary." The United
States had not demonstrated, as required of a party invoking an Article
XX exception, that it had exhausted all alternative remedies reasonably
available to it to pursue its dolphin protection policy through GATT
consistent measures.88
The panel then addressed Article XX(g), stating that Article
XX(g) requires measures relating to the conservation of exhaustible re-
sources to be taken "in conjunction with restrictions on domestic pro-
duction or consumption."89 Relying on a past panel decision,9 0 the
panel noted that such measures would only be found to be in conjunc-
tion with domestic production restrictions "if [the measures were] pri-
marily aimed at rendering effective these restrictions."91 Because a
country can effectively control the production or consumption of an ex-
82. Id.
83. Id. 5.26.
84. See id. T 5.27.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. 5.28.
88. Id. Finally, even if the import prohibition were the only reasonable alternative,
it still could not be considered "necessary" within the meaning of XX(b) because it
was based on such unpredictable conditions. Because the United States linked the max-
imum incidental take for Mexico to the actual take of the United States, the Mexican
authorities could not know at a given time whether their policies conformed to U.S.
protection measures. id.
89. Id. 5.31.
90. Panel Report, Canada - Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring
and Salmon, adopted Mar. 22, 1988, GATT, BISD 35S/98, 114, I 4.6 [hereinafter
Canada Report].
91. Panel Report, supra note 32, IT 5.31.
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haustible natural resource only to the extent that the production or
consumption is within its jurisdiction, the panel found that Article
XX(g) only permits contracting parties to take trade measures restrict-
ing production and consumption within their jurisdiction.92
Furthermore, as with Article XX(b), if extrajurisdictional inter-
pretation were accepted, each contracting party could unilaterally de-
termine the conservation policies that other countries would be required
to follow under the GATT.93 Thus, the panel concluded that the direct
import ban against Mexico was not justified by Article XX(g).94
The panel did, however, find in favor of the U.S. position on the
Pelly Amendment, despite Mexico's assertion that the possible exten-
sion of import prohibitions to all fish products under section 101
(a)(2)(D) and section 8 of the FPA was inconsistent with Article XI of
the GATT."6 The panel acknowledged that previous panel reports
stated that legislation requiring inconsistent action with the GATT is
inconsistent with the GATT, whether or not an occasion for its actual
application has arisen.96 However, the panel responded that legislation
that merely gives the executive authorities power to act inconsistently is
not, by itself, inconsistent with the GATT.97
The panel later addressed the intermediary nation embargo, also
known as the "secondary embargo." As with the panel's decision re-
garding the primary embargo, the panel found that the secondary em-
bargo regulations were not applied to tuna as a product.98 Therefore,
the embargo did not fall within the provisions of Article III 9 and was
thus a non-tariff barrier prohibited by Article XI. 100 The United States
again invoked the exceptions under Article XX(b) and (g) - claiming
92. Panel Report, supra note 32, 5.31.
93. Id. 5.32. In addition, the import restriction was not a measure "relating to
the conservation of exhaustible natural resources" because it was not "primarily aimed
at such conservation." Id. 5.33. The panel said that the MMPA regulations were not
primarily aimed at such conservation because the regulations relied on unpredictable
factors. For example, the Mexican authorities did not know, at any given moment,
whether their taking rate met the MMPA requirements. Id. In support of the "primar-
ily aimed at" requirement, the panel cited the Canada Report, supra note 90. Id.
94. Panel Report, supra note 32, $ 5.34.
95. Id. $ 5.20.
96. Id. 5.21. The panel referred to Panel Report, United States - Taxes on Pe-
troleum and Certain Imported Substances, adopted June 17, 1987, BISD 34S/136.
160, 163-4, 5.2.2, 5.2.9-10; and Panel Report, EEC- Regulation on Imports of Parts
and Components, BISD 37S/132, L/6657, adopted May 16, 1990, 1 5.25-5.26. Id.
97. Panel Report, supra note 32, 5.21.
98. Id. 5.35.
99. Id.
100. See id.
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the secondary embargo was necessary to protect dolphin life and re-
lated to the conservation of natural resources - but the panel found
that the considerations that led the panel to reject the exceptions as
applied to the direct embargo applied equally to the intermediary
embargo."'1
Finally, the panel addressed the Dolphin Protection Consumer In-
formation Act (DPCIA). 1° 2 Mexico contended that the labelling provi-
sions of DPCIA were inconsistent with Article 1:1 because they dis-
criminated against Mexico." ° ' The panel disagreed, stating that the
labelling requirements did not restrict the sale of tuna products, be-
cause tuna could be sold with or without a label.1 0 4 Nor did these pro-
visions establish requirements that must be met in order to obtain an
,advantage from the government; the advantage rests in the choice of
the consumers. 0 5 Therefore, the panel concluded that the labelling pro-
visions did not condition the right to sell tuna upon tuna harvesting
methods, nor did it condition access to government-conferred advan-
tages. Moreover, although the DPCIA affected only the tuna harvest-
ing methods used in the ETP, it did not solely discriminate against
Mexican tuna since the labelling requirements applied to all countries
whose vessels fished in this geographical area.0 6 For the above reasons,
the labelling requirements of the DPCIA were not found to be inconsis-
tent with Article 1: 107
The GATT panel made four concluding remarks. First, the panel
noted that it was only examining the issues "in light of the relevant
GATT provisions."'108 The panel was not commenting on the appropri-
ateness of the conservation policies of the contracting parties. 0 9 Sec-
ond, the panel explained that the GATT places few constraints on "a
101. Id. 5.38. The United States also invoked Article XX(d), which excepted
from GATT obligations those measures that are "necessary to secure compliance with
laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement."
Panel Report, supra note 32, 1 5.39.
The panel stated that the secondary embargo was necessary to support the direct
embargo. Therefore, because the direct embargo was inconsistent with the GATT, the
secondary embargo could not be justified by Article XX(d). Id. 5.40.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 44-47.
103. Panel Report, supra note 32, 1 5.42.
104. Id. The statute only requires certain harvesting standards to be met before a
"dolphin safe" label can be put on the tuna product. 16 U.S.C. § 1385(d).
105. Panel Report, supra note 32, 5.42.
106. Id. 5.43.
107. Id. 11 5.44.
108. Id. 6.1.
109. Id.
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contracting party's implementation of domestic environmental poli-
cies."' 10 For example, under the GATT, a contracting party is free to
tax or regulate imported products and like domestic products as long as
its taxes or regulations do not discriminate against imported products
or afford protection to domestic products.1 ' A contracting party is also
free to tax or regulate domestic production for environmental pur-
poses. " 2 As a corollary to these rights, the panel decided, "a con-
tracting party may not restrict imports of a product merely because it
originates in a country with environmental policies different from its
own.""' Third, an embargo imposed to respond to differences in envi-
ronmental regulation of producers could not be justified under Article
XX(b) or XX(g).'" Because the Article XX exceptions did not specify
limits on the range of life, health and resource protection policies for
which the Article XX exceptions could be invoked, it would be best for
the CONTRACTING PARTIES to implement such regulations - not
by interpreting these exceptions, but instead by amending, supplement-
ing, or waiving the obligations of the GATT." 5 In so doing, the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES could impose specific limits on the range of
policy differences and develop criteria to prevent abuse."'
The panel concluded therefore, that adoption of this report would
not affect the rights of CONTRACTING PARTIES to pursue their
domestic environmental policies and to cooperate with one another in
harmonizing their policies," 7 nor affect the right to act jointly to
amend the GATT to address international environmental problems that
can only be resolved through measures in conflict with the present rules
of GATT." 8 Finally, the panel recommended that the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES request the United States to bring the MMPA
measures into conformity with its GATT obligations." 9
110. Id. 6.2.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. T 6.3.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Harmonization of environmental standards, however, has been criticized as a
mechanism to pull national standards down to the lowest common denominator. See
Hearing, supra note 48, at 66 (testimony of Ralph Nader).
118. Panel Report, supra note 32, 1 6.4.
119. Id. T 7.1(c).
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V. IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCES OF THE PANEL DECISION
Typically, contracting parties are expected to comply with any rec-
ommendations put to them by the full Council on the basis of the
panel's report. 120 A failure to do so subjects the country to political
pressure from the other contracting countries.1 21 In addition, Article
XXIII:2, 22 which gives force to the recommendations" in the panel re-
ports, provides for retaliatory measures by other contracting parties.' 2'
Such measures can include sanctions, reciprocal trade regulation and
monetary damage awards to the country requesting the other to act. 2
Moreover, the CONTRACTING PARTIES can oversee any matter
for which they have made recommendations, and if the recommended
action is not taken, the contracting party that initiated the action may
ask to intervene to find an appropriate solution. 25
Thus, once a panel decision has been approved by the full GATT
council, refusal to follow its directives may well result in disciplinary
measures. In this case, if the panel decision is adopted and Congress
refuses to eliminate the MMPA provisions, the United States could
face countervailing trade sanctions or fines.' 26 It should be extremely
difficult for the United States to refuse compliance in light of its own
criticisms of other nations who defy the GATT provisions. 27
As of this writing, however, adoption of the panel decision is
doubtful. At the time of the panel decision, Mexico and the United
States were negotiating the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA).121 In order to facilitate those talks, Mexico postponed call-
ing for the full GATT Council to rule on the U.S. embargo. 29 Instead,
120. LONG, supra note 2, at 85.
121. Id.
122. GATT, supra note 14, art. XXIII:2 at 671.
123. LONG, supra note 2, at 77.
124. Hearing, supra note 48, at 57 (testimony of David Phillips, Executive Direc-
tor of Earth Island Institute).
125. LONG, supra note 2, at 78.
126. Hearing, supra note 48, at 73 (testimony of Ralph Nader).
127. See Keith Bradsher, U.S. Ban on Mexico Tuna Is Overruled, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 23, 1991, at DI. The United States, for example, threatened unilateral retaliatory
action against the European Community (EC) when the EC refused to implement a
1985 GATT dispute panel ruling against the EC. The panel found in favor of the U.S.
position that the EC's lower tariff benefits for Mediterranean citrus producers offset
fair access for U.S. citrus shippers. See U.S., EC Call Truce in Escalating Tariff War,
Set October Deadline to Settle Citrus Dispute, 2 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 30, at
949-50 (July 24, 1985).
128. The text of NAFTA can be found in LEXIS, Genfed Library, Extra;4 File.
129. Bowing to U.S. Pressure, Mexico to Have Observers on Tuna Boats, Delays
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Mexico promised to step up protection of dolphins, pledging that by
1994 there will be a total moratorium on fishing for yellowfin tuna us-
ing the current nets. 180 In return, the Bush administration proposed
amending the MMPA to provide for a five-year moratorium on the
practice of setting purse-seine nets on dolphins beginning March 1,
1994.11 The U.S. would then lift the embargo for those nations that
commit to implementing the moratorium. 1 2 At the end of five-year
moratorium, the countries would again be subject to embargo unless
they conformed with the MMPA criteria. 33
The GATT threat to the MMPA, however, is far from over. Sub-
sequent to the panel decision, the U.S. District Court in San Francisco
reaffirmed the MMPA secondary embargo provisions.' 3 Angered by
this court decision and Mexico's refusal to pursue the panel report, the
European Community (EC), which is affected by the secondary em-
bargo, demanded that the GATT Council adopt the panel decision.135
Since adoption will not occur without Mexico's request, however, the
EC then requested that another GATT dispute panel be formed to
again look into the legality of the embargo provisions of the MMPA.'
GATT Action, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 38, at 1411-12 (Sept. 25, 1991).
130. See EC Urges Adoption of Tuna Report but U.S., Mexico Claim Accord is
Near, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at 524-25 (Mar. 25, 1992).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. This proposal - not law as of this writing - has been criticized by
environmentalists as failing to secure a permanent end to setting purse-seine nets on
dolphins and containing numerous loopholes. For example, Representative Barbara
Boxer (D-Calif.) stated: "In my view the primary motivation of the [proposal] is to
assuage the concerns of the Mexican government as a way of furthering negotiations
for the North American Free Trade Agreement." Id. at 525. Indeed, before Congress
adopted the fast track for NAFTA negotiations, many members of Congress predicted
the.clash between free trade and environmental protection. Environmentalists had tried
to block fast track approval of the negotiations, but the Bush administration assured
Congress that environment, health and safety laws would not suffer as a result of the
agreement. See 137 CONG. REC. H5217 (daily ed. June 27, 1991) (statement of Rep.
Collins). Many, however, still fear that the free trade agreement is an indirect way of
forcing environmental backsliding that couild not be achieved directly. Jessica Ma-
thews, Dolphins, Tuna and Free Trade, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 1991, at A21 [hereinaf-
ter Mathews].
134. Earth Island Inst. v. Mosbacher, 785 F. Supp. 826 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
135. GATT. EEC Urges Council to Adopt Panel Ruling on US Tuna Ban, EUR.
ENV., Mar. 3, 1992 [hereinafter EEC Urges].
136. See Panelists Being Selected for Second GA TT Panel on Tuna, 9 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) No. 36, at 1552-53 (Sept. 2, 1992) [hereinafter Second GATT Panel].
The EC asserts that it does not oppose the U.S. environmental objectives, but feels the
best way to protect the dolphin is through multilateral rules. EEC Urges, supra note
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This request was agreed to July 14, 1992.137
VI. IMPLICATIONS OF THE PANEL DECISION
Not only is the MMPA threatened by potential GATT action, but
other environmental acts are endangered as well. Instead of narrowing
the decision to the MMPA, the first panel report announced a poten-
tially devastating interpretation of the exceptions of Article XX(b) and
Article XX(g), 138 and the requirements of Article III. The panel report
reached two conclusions.139 First, environmental laws cannot extend be-
yond national boundaries.14 0 Under the GATT, no nation can enact a
law protecting the global commons or the species inhabiting them if the
law adversely impacts on trade.14 1 Second, the GATT does not allow a
nation to consider how products or commodities are produced or har-
vested in determining equal treatment under Article 111.142 If a product
is not itself dangerous to the environment, and the measure does not
concern the characteristics of the product itself, any import ban is an
illegal non-tariff barrier.1 43 Thus the United States is obligated to treat
imports equally, regardless of how they are harvested. These holdings
apply regardless of identical requirements for domestically produced
products.14 4 The panel report also required the challenged party to
show that the law at issue is the least trade restrictive means of enact-
ing its policy goals. This requirement places a heavy burden on the
party who is trying to defend environmental policies and ultimately in-
creases the likelihood of striking down environmental laws.145
Critics of the decision have listed many U.S. environmental laws
that are potentially threatened should the GATT decision ever be
adopted." 46 A few of the numerous laws threatened are the African El-
135.
137. Second GATT Panel, supra note 136, at 1552.
138. Hearing, supra note 48, at 68 (testimony of Ralph Nader).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See id. at 56 (testimony of David Phillips, Executive Director of Earth Island
Institute).
143. GATT Official Assesses Tuna Decision's Impact on Link Between Environ-
ment, Trade, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 41, at 1505 (Oct. 16, 1991).
144. See also Hearing, supra note 48, at 1 (opening statement of Henry A. Wax-
man, Chairman of Subcommittee on Health and the Environment).
145. See id. at 69 (testimony of Ralph Nader).
146. See Hearing, supra note 48, at 59 (testimony of David Phillips, Executive
Director of Earth Island Institute).
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ephant Conservation Act, " 7 the Magnuson Fisheries Conservation and
Management Act,148 and the Lacey Act.14 1
Additionally, U.S. obligations under international environmental
agreements could conflict with the panel decision. Because most inter-
national treaties are applied through national laws, any agreement that
employs trade measures is implicated as well.' 50 Without trade mea-
sures, however, few tools are left with which to influence the behavior
of other countries.' 5' Even within a broad treaty, trade sanctions are an
effective tool to discourage countries from enjoying a treaty's benefits
without conforming to its requirements.5 2 Without such sanctions, a
country's attempts to protect the environment would be limited to the
protections of its own finite portion of the ocean or global commons, a
somewhat futile endeavor in a world of global ecosystems.' 53
These concerns about the destruction of environmental laws and
obligations are not hypothetical: many nations have begun to challenge
environmental laws as contrary to free trade agreements. For example,
Canadian asbestos manufacturers and the Canadian government sued
to overturn the U.S. ban on asbestos, arguing that it was an unfair
trade barrier under the GATT and the Canada Free Trade Agree-
ment.'54 Although the court dismissed the case, holding that Canada
had no standing, the court found that the EPA failed to bring forth
147. 16 U.S.C. §§ 4202-4245 (1988). "This Act effectively banned the import of
elephant ivory in 1989 and helped trigger the international trade ban by the Conven-
tion on International Trade and Endangered Species." Hearing, supra note 48, at 59
(testimony of David Phillips, Executive Director of Earth Island Institute). The GATT
ruling would thwart a nation's efforts to put up unilateral trade barriers to natural
resources taken in an ecologically unsound manner. Id.
148. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (1988). "The [GATT] ruling could forbid [this
Act's] management reach beyond the U.S. exclusive economic zone." Hearing, supra
note 48, at 59 (testimony of David Phillips, Executive Director of Earth Island
Institute).
149. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371-3378 (1988). This Act makes it a federal crime to import,
export, sell protected fish and wildlife, in contravention of law. Hearing, supra note 48,
at 59 (testimony of David Phillips, Executive Director of Earth Island Institute). "The
GATT Panel's decision affects this Act in so far as a state or foreign conservation law
is itself extra-jurisdictional." Id.
150. Mathews, supra note 133, at A21. Examples of treaties in danger are the
Montreal Treaty on stratospheric ozone and the treaty banning trade in endangered
species. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See id.
154. Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991).
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sufficient evidence in support of its ban. 1 "5 Had the Canadian govern-
ment brought its argument before the GATT, the case could have in-
deed turned out differently. In another challenge, German beer produc-
ers objected to a Denmark regulation that banned the sale of beer not
bottled in refillable bottles. 156 Because most beer outside Denmark is
not produced in refillable bottles, the Germans said that the regulation
was an unfair restraint on trade.1 5 In yet another challenge, Japan
fought a ban on the export of raw logs by Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines and the United States. 5 8 Japan imports virtually all its
wood and claimed the ban, which was intended to conserve forest re-
sources, was an unfair trade measure. 5 9
Few will dispute the fact that the United States cannot directly
regulate the conduct of foreign nations. Nor do most people deny the
importance of free trade and the desire to bar any laws that are truly
only protectionist measures."' Nevertheless, there must be coexistence
between environmental protection and free trade; economic prosperity
cannot take precedence over the perpetuation of life-supporting ecosys-
tems. At the risk of simplifying the issues, a country must be able to
act unilaterally when progressive multilateral agreements are simply
not viable. The United States should be able to bar entry to its markets
and thereby indirectly affect the conduct of vessels fishing in interna-
tional waters as a means of avoiding the destruction of marine mam-
mals.""' If the MMPA did not apply extrajurisdictionally, the Act
155. Id.
156. Clyde H. Farnsworth, Environment v. Free Trade, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11,
1991, at D4.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. Not only have countries challenged environmental laws, but recent
GATT negotiations have also endangered a country's ability to further its environmen-
tal policies. According to drafts of the agreement from the Uruguay Round (the cur-
rent round of GATT negotiations), for example, pressure could be applied on the
United States to tailor certain of its health laws to meet international standards, re-
gardless of whether those standards are lower than United States standards. Hearing,
supra note 48, at 2 (opening statement of Henry A. Waxman, Chairman of Subcom-
mittee on Health and the Environment). Furthermore, the panel decision has the po-
tential to extend to non-environmental trade sanctions, such as those relating to labor
rights practices, e.g., bans on products produced through child labor. Id. at 69 (testi-
mony of Ralph Nader). Also challenged could be restrictions on trade from South Af-
rica because of apartheid. Id. at 1 (opening statement of Henry A. Waxman, Chair-
man of Subcommittee on Health and the Environment).
160. Hearing, supra note 48, at 2 (opening statement of Henry A. Waxman,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Health and the Environment).
161. Not surprisingly, many members of GATT disagree. A recent GATT report,
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would do little more than disadvantage domestic harvesters relative to
foreign competitors who use cheaper, non-dolphin safe methods.' 62
This U.S. disadvantage reflects a broader conflict between trade
and the environment that results when countries choose to enact
stricter environmental regulations. Countries who do so increase costs
and hurt their own competitiveness. 68 By contrast, countries that im-
pose less restrictive environmental protection requirements are able to
produce at an artificially lower cost." 4 These countries are then at a
competitive advantage when trading with a nation that does protect the
environment. 66
For these reasons, the need for the GATT to address these issues
becomes even more pronounced. The GATT will always be fundamen-
tally at odds with environmental protection as long as it remains un-
waveringly committed to free trade. Indeed, David Woods, head of in-
formation at GATT headquarters in Geneva, acknowledged that
GATT has no mechanism for making any kind of judgments about the
linkages between the trade and the environment. 66 Thus, once GATT
has ruled against a domestic law, immense pressure is applied to the
offending country no matter how beneficial its policies are. 6 7 Funda-
mental change within GATT is necessary.
VII. RESPONSES TO THE PANEL DECISION
Many legislators and environmentalists have proposed responses to
this dilemma. The proposals to the GATT/environmental conflict vary
and include a combination of the following possibilities: amending the
GATT to address domestic environmental regulation affecting the
global commons and affecting production processes; changing the
for example, notes that unilateral action creates the potential for protectionist abuses
by wealthy nations. The report asserts that if industrial nations are truly concerned
with environmental protection, they should trade with developing nations. Free trade,
the argument continues, will make the developing countries wealthier and eventually
enable them to afford environmental controls. See Joel Havemann, Doing Business;
Recycling Law Ignites Trade-Barrier Debate, L.A. TIMEs, Apr. 7, 1992, at 7.
162. Hearing, supra note 48, at 55 (testimony of David Phillips, Executive Direc-
tor of Earth Island Institute).
163. See JACKSON, supra note 6, at 208-10; Rubin & Graham, supra note 1, at
161.
164. Baucus, supra note 7, at S13,169.
165. Id.
166. Farnsworth, supra note 156, at D4.
167. Hearing, supra note 48, at 2 (opening statement of Henry A. Waxman,
Chairman of Subcommittee on Health and the Environment).
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GATT dispute resolution process; 8 adopting a congressional resolution
rejecting any GATT or free trade agreement that might threaten
American health, safety or environmental standards; and creating a
GATT environmental code modeled on the subsidies code. 69
Amending GATT may be the most long-term solution, but the
amendment procedure is difficult. Unanimity is required to amend Ar-
ticles I, II, or XXX. 170 The other articles require a two-thirds rrlajor-
ity.17  Even a two-thirds majority is difficult to achieve due to the wide
diversity of interests which the GATT encompasses.172 Countries with
little stake in an amendment are reluctant to make the political effort
necessary to gain approval from their legislative branches. 73 Further-
more, amendments apply only to those countries that accept them. 74
Nonetheless, many citizen groups have proposed amendments to
the GATT. One such proposal would prevent "ecological dumping.' 7
Ecological dumping occurs when an industry is able to flood an interna-
tional market with cheap goods because it has failed to pay the full
costs of dealing with its pollution from production of the goods.176 The
ecological dumping proposal calls for such activity to be regarded as an
impermissible subsidy. 7 7 A country that has internalized these costs
would be entitled to impose a tariff against the product of the offending
country - Mexican tuna, for example - or provide a countervailing
subsidy to its own industry.176
168. Ralph Nader suggests establishing freestanding environmental and consumer
advocacy advisory committees. Id. at 74 (testimony of Ralph Nader) (the present sys-
tem of advisory committees "resemble nothing more than a string of K Street lobbying
firms."). Further criticism of the dispute resolution process is directed toward the
secretiveness of the negotiations. In this instance, that secretiveness enabled the United
States administration to put forth an unenthusiastic defense without Congress learning
of its actions. Id. at 72 (testimony of Ralph Nader).
169. See infra text accompanying notes 170-99.
170. GATT, supra note 14, art. XXX at 677. See also LONG, supra note 2, at 16.
171. GATT, supra note 14, art. XXX at 677. See also LONG, supra note 2, at 16;
JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 13, at 310.
172. JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 13, at 310.
173. LONG, supra note 2, at 16.
174. GATT, supra note 14, at 677. See also JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 13,
at 310.
175. John Hunt, Free Traders Heading for Clash with Greens, FIN. TIMES, Sept.
5, 1991, at 6.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 7. A similar concept has been proposed by Senator David Boren (D-
Okla.), but the proposal would only change U.S. law. The International Pollution De-
terrence Act, S. 984, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), would make a country's failure to
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U.S. legislators have also proposed responses to the GATT envi-
ronment dilemma. Some senators, for example, have called for a
change in the GATT to support global environmental policy while
maintaining the nondiscriminatory application of trade rules. 179 In a
letter to President Bush, Senator Ernest Hollings (D-S.C.) and 62 of
his fellow senators advocated this position and asked the President to
block adoption of the panel report. 8 ' The senators urged the United
States trade representatives to impress upon their trading partners the
need to ensure GATT recognition of the legitimate objectives of envi-
ronmental protection. 181 The senators asked the President to refrain
from entering into any agreements with any country until the issue has
been fully discussed in the appropriate committees.'
The senators also recommended immediate action, rather than
waiting for the current round of negotiations to end. 183 However, they
cautioned against a temporary "quick fix," such as settling the problem
with Mexico in the NAFTA, since legislation implementing NAFTA
will be on a fast track.' 8 ' Lastly, the senators reminded the President of
his commitment not to weaken environmental laws in the NAFTA.185
Other congressional proposals have been more specific. Senator
Max Baucus (D-Mont.) proposed a GATT environmental code
impose and enforce pollution controls on its industries a countervailing subsidy under
U.S. law. Baucus Calls for Environmental Code in GATT Modeled After Subsidies
Code, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 43, at 1568 (Oct. 30, 1991).
179. 137 CONG. REC. E3513 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1991) (statement by Rep. Stark).
180. Letter from Senator Hollings (D-S.C.) to President Bush (Oct. 3, 1991), in
137 CONG. REC. S15,245,46 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991) (statement of Sen. Hollings)
[hereinafter Hollings].
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. Others caution that injecting the issue into the current Uruguay Round
would constitute the last straw for the faltering discussions. Although this view has
prevailed, not addressing the issue until the next Round promises years of international
clashes. Mathews, supra note 133, at A21.
184. Hollings, supra note 180. Fast track allows a final Congressional vote on the
agreement, but prohibits Congressional amendments.
185. Id. There is some dispute, however, as to whether President Bush met his
commitment. President Bush announced that the NAFTA provides that no NAFTA
country should lower its health, safety or environmental standards for the purposes of
attracting investment. Environmentalists, however, argue that these NAFTA provisions
do not provide any enforcement mechanism against countries who do lower their envi-
ronmental standards. Moreover, tough U.S. standards challenged as trade barriers
must meet a series of balancing tests to show that the environmental benefits are
greater than potential business losses. Public Citizen Says NAFTA Summary Falls
Short on Environmental Issues, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 35, at 1502-03 (Aug.
26, 1992) [hereinafter Public Citizen].
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modeled on the current subsidies code.186 The code would allow each
nation to set its own environment protection standards.18 If the im-
ported products or the process used do not meet the importing nation's
environmental standards, duties could be applied to the imported prod-
uct, provided that: (1) the environmental protection standards have a
sound scientific basis; (2) the same standards are applied to all compet-
itive domestic production; and (3) the imported products are causing
economic injury to competitive domestic production. 188 Senator Baucus
argues that these three criteria help to ensure that the environmental
standards are not a guise for protectionism. 189 Furthermore, the offset-
ting duties should be set at a level sufficient to counter any economic
advantage gained by producing the product under less stringent envi-
ronmental production regulations. 9 '
Under such a code, nations would be allowed to ban imports of
goods produced in a manner that violates internationally recognized
norms.' 9 ' Senator Baucus put forth three advantages to this code: (1)
"it would help to level the playing field for U.S. businesses that are
forced to meet higher environmental standards than the foreign com-
petitors. Environmental protection would no longer necessarily have a
negative impact on the competitiveness of U.S. businesses;" (2) it
would "encourage nations to adopt sound environmental protection.
Much of the economic advantage to maintaining lax environmental
standards would be gone;" and (3) it would "correct an obvious defi-
ciency in the GATT demonstrated by the recent dispute settlement
panel ruling in the Mexican tuna case." '92
Some economists, however, disagree as to the underlying theory of
an environmental code. A European Community document, for exam-
ple, advocated a "polluter pays" principle instead of an environmental
code, a principle that places the costs of environmental regulation on
the businesses themselves.' It challenged the argument that such costs
adversely impact on competitiveness, and warned against applying
compensatory trade restrictions against developing nations who have
186. Baucus, supra note 7, at S13,169.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. However, at least one difficulty of side codes is that they only obligate
those countries who agree to be bound. See JACKSON, supra note 6, at 227.
193. See Commission Analyzes Problems Posed in Post-Uruguay Round Era, 8
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 38, at 1405 (Sept. 25, 1991).
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less strict environmental requirements."' Such restrictions, the docu-
ment warned, could result in trade tension and' fragmentation of
markets. 9 '
Nonetheless, the document acknowledged that in some circum-
stances trade restrictions will complement environmental policies. 9 '
When this is the case, the document advised, the GATT should clearly
set forth when such restrictions are appropriate, taking into considera-
tion the trade and environmental policy objectives, as well as the con-
cerns of developing countries. 97
As for subsidies granted for environmental protection, the docu-
ment similarly noted that the criteria for such subsidies must be estab-
lished. 98 These criteria are necessary to prevent trade conflicts arising
when a country applies countervailing duties on imports of the subsi-
dized product. 99
VIII. CONCLUSION
By labelling a broad range of environmental regulations non-tariff
barriers under Article XI, the 45 year-old GATT2 . sacrifices hard-won
environmental protections for the sole purpose of eliminating trade bar-
riers.2"' The U.S. government should put immense pressure on the
CONTRACTING PARTIES to amend the GATT to deal with this
problem. Indeed, multilateral solutions should be the first choice, but
cannot be the only choice. Often, multilateral agreements advocate har-
monization of environmental standards that result in environmental
objectives being reduced to the least common denominator.120 Unilat-
eral action may be the only effective means of achieving environmental
progress. Without fundamental reform in the GATT, similar conflicts
are inevitable and the threat of environment deterioration will increase.
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